Talkin ‘bout law’s generations: pop culture, intellectual property and the interpretation of case by Leiboff, Marett
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2013 
Talkin ‘bout law’s generations: pop culture, intellectual property and the 
interpretation of case 
Marett Leiboff 
University of Wollongong, marett@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leiboff, Marett, "Talkin ‘bout law’s generations: pop culture, intellectual property and the interpretation of 
case" (2013). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers. 966. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/966 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Talkin ‘bout law’s generations: pop culture, intellectual property and the 
interpretation of case 
Abstract 
This article takes a very different path through which to explore the challenges affecting and shaping 
innovation and communications law. It reports on a facet of an empirical pilot study into generational 
differences in legal interpretation that revealed the porosity and friability of doctrine. The article focuses 
on one facet of the study apposite to this special issue: a fleeting reference by Finkelstein J to icons of 
pop culture in an otherwise unremarkable passing off I misleading and deceptive conduct case - Hansen v 
Bickfords - involving the marketing of an energy drink. As the responses of lawyer and law student 
participants to these references show, the courts and legal interpreters draw on a reserve of tacit 
knowledge through which their reading and the interpretation of the law is filtered. The explicit reference 
in a judgment to such tacit knowledge (in the form of the pop cultural) allows us to glimpse the ways in 
which technocratic law is read through a range of filters that are presumed to form no part of the process 
of legal interpretation, revealing just how generationally inflected legal interpretation is, showing how 
much haphazard, everyday misconceptions and trivialities can actively shape the understanding and 
deployment of law by its practitioners. 
Keywords 
pop, interpretation, generations, law, bout, talkin, property, intellectual, culture, case 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Leiboff, M. (2013). Talkin ‘bout law’s generations: pop culture, intellectual property and the interpretation 
of case. Law in Context, 29 (1), 95-116. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/966 
 1 
Talkin’ bout law’s generations: pop culture, intellectual property, 
and the interpretation of case law 
Associate Professor Marett Leiboff1 
  
Tempis Fugit  
 
It is perhaps axiomatic to assume that the challenges and threats posed by 
communications and intellectual property technologies are best solved by a 
technocratic law that addresses a technological problem with a technological 
solution.  This is the standard response of law to the perils and shock of the new, 
and, in a Weberian sense, is law in its most rational mode. It assume that any 
legislative intervention will be resolved where necessary using standard 
interpretative techniques which will filter out any inappropriate personal 
responses to the matter at hand through the adoption of the appropriately applied 
tests and techniques imbricated into the law in a formal sense. Intellectual 
property law is not different from any other area of law in this respect.   
 
In contrast to this type of formal account of the conduct of law and its actors, the 
research reported and performed in this article reveals that our ability to read, 
encounter and interpret law is not quiteas straightforward and is far more 
inflected than we would like to believeas a raft of critical theories have presumed 
for some time.  Communications and intellectual property law is not immune from 
(and is perhaps even more affected by) the unconscious and subconscious 
deployment of interpretative filters that inflect our ability to read and interpret the 
law (and not just the facts), ironically, by cannibalistically drawing on its own 
subjects - popular culture. The field covered by communications and intellectual 
                                                 
1
 Marett Leiboff is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Wollongong.  She is a 
member of the Law and Popular Cultures Group of the Legal Intersections Research Centre and Vice 
President of the Law Literature and Humanities Association of Australasia. I would like to thank participants 
at a range of fora for their helpful interventions, comments and questions, all of which have contributed to 
my thinking and unravelling of the information revealed in the project described in part in this article and the 
helpful insights of the reviewers of this article. 
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property law is suffused with popular culture, but it is not popular culture as the 
subject matter of the law that is under consideration here.  Instead, by drawing 
on the generational markers of the pop cultural, the legal actor is shown to filter 
the technocratic language of the law through a purple haze,2 under the influence 
of smoke on the water,3 while wearing a raspberry beret,4 and walking on 
sunshine.5  In short, the interpreter’s generational mise-en-scène will subvert the 
technocratic in the most unexpected and unintended ways – the generational tics 
and inflections that unwittingly destabilise or embellish the most innocent of law’s 
textual intentionalities. 
 
This article thus takes a very different path through which to explore the 
challenges affecting and shaping innovation and communications law, the 
subject of the special issue of this journal.  I report on a facet of an empirical pilot 
study into generational differences in legal interpretation that revealed the 
porosity and friability of doctrine.6  I focus here on one facet of the study apposite 
to this special issue: a fleeting reference by Finkelstein J to icons of pop culture 
in an otherwise unremarkable passing off/misleading and deceptive conduct case 
- Hansen v Bickfords - involving the marketing of an energy drink.7  As the 
responses of participants to these references show (this isdiscussed in depth 
later in this article), the courts and legal interpreters draw on a reserve of tacit 
knowledge through which their reading and the interpretation of the law is filtered.  
The explicit reference in a judgment to such tacit knowledge (in the form of the 
                                                 
2
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3
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4
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5
 Katrina and the Waves 1983 
6
 For a discussion of the project and its broader ambit see: Marett Leiboff, ‘’Ditto’: Law, Pop Culture and 
Humanities and the Impact of Intergenerational Interpretative Dissonance' (2012) 36 Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 145. 
7
 Hansen Beverage Company v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] 251 ALR 1. 
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pop cultural) allows us to glimpse the ways in which technocratic law is read 
through a range of filters that are presumed to form no part of the process of 
legal interpretation.  The study as a whole shows just how generationally 
inflected legal interpretation is, showing how much haphazard, everyday 
misconceptions and trivialitiescan actively shape the understanding and 
deployment of law by its practitioners..8 The example explored here, drawn from 
the panoply of intellectual property law, provides an intimate case study through 
which to see how dramatically the interpretative capacities of the law can be 
tripped up by something as seemingly irrelevant as references to popular culture. 
Harmless references by Finkelstein J to Breakfast at Tiffany’s, James Bond’s 
Aston Martin, and Janis Joplin revealed three things: firstly that lawyers are not 
immune from drawing on popular culture and making meaning using it, second, 
deploying that meaning in order to construe and interpret the textual 
intentionalities of the judgment, and thirdly that the intended use of those 
references cannot be vouchsafed.  Indeed, it will be seen that even very recent 
cases such as this 2008 decision will be read differently across a generational 
divide, and the results of this study show that without guidance, we cannot fully 
grasp the repository that makes up case law outside of our own generationally 
grounded time and place.  In short, we read the past, not with the clarity of 
hindsight, but through a purple haze, in which we insist on creating new readings, 
all the while presuming we read the texts concerned without drawing on any 
heuristic devices through which to shape and filter those texts.  This study shows 
how easily the sharpest of legal texts will be filled with the textual reorderings 
grounded within the most unlikely of devices: pop culture.  
 
                                                 
8
 For an illustration of the characterisation of a trade practices case with the remit of technology:  David 
Jacobson, ‘Drink name dispute to be reheard’ Australian Technology and IP Business: Making Technology 
and Intellectual Property Work for You (Lawfully) (27 December 2008) 
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Talkin’ ‘bout whose generations?  
 
The Australian TV comedy quiz show, Talkin' ‘bout generation (emphasis added), 
pits the knowledge of three different teams of generations against each other. 
The format was devised in Australia by Granada Australia, and broadcast 
through the commercial Channel 10.9 First broadcast in 2009, the show is a 
blend of parlour game and trivial pursuit which in turn draws on the legacies of a 
Frankfurt school inspired cultural studies. The program pits Baby Boomers, Gen 
X and Gen Y against each other in a series of tasks which test the pop cultural 
(and more general) knowledge held by the different generations. The program 
exposes the speed with which knowledge, language and meaning is lost and 
misinterpreted across and between generations, how difficult it is to acquire 
knowledge before or after formative periods in time, and how marked and 
profound differences in knowledge exist between the different generations.  
 
This empirical study - Talkin' ‘bout law's generations (‘the project’) – in part 
reported here,10 takes its cue from its namesake, and explores if social, political, 
historical and linguistic knowledge, including pop culture, is drawn upon by 
different generations of legal interpreters as part of the process of reading legal 
texts, and in particular what happens to the process of reasoning when this non-
legal knowledge is lost.  The program and its theoretical antecedents has been 
used as a springboard for this study; if generational differences are as marked as 
the TV program suggests, what would this mean for law’s ‘generations’?  If you 
as reader do not know the television program, then the references made here are 
rendered meaningless – QED perhaps - but if you know the program but don’t 
reference the title through the 1965 hit, My Generation by The Who (the refrain 
                                                 
9
 Wikipedia, Talkin' 'Bout Your Generation (10 November 2012) 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talkin'_'Bout_Your_Generation>. 
10
 University of Wollongong Human Research Ethics Approval HE10/206, Talkin’ ‘bout law’s generations: an 
empirical and jurisprudential investigation into the reading of legal cases by different generations of lawyers, 
approval 10 June 2010. All results are held on file with the author.  The surveys have no identifying 
information about individuals and interviews are anonymised. 
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‘talkin’ ‘bout my generation’ is reprised throughout the song) along with the 
sedimentations of 1960s drug culture and intergenerational angst, then the wider 
import of the program’s own touchstones are lost, and are read in part by some, 
more completely by others, or are simply lost on others.   
 
The late 20th and early 21st centuries have been saturated with commentary and 
discussion about generational differences, which, while drawing on sociological, 
statistical and demographic analysis, has also been played out in the realm of 
popular culture, focussing particularly on so-called Baby Boomers, Gen X and 
Gen Y.  This study takes as a given the classificatory groupings of the 
generation, and uses the broad notion that people who grew up in a particular 
time and place will share certain forms of tacit knowledge and will not share other 
forms of knowledge.11 It consciously draws upon the idea of the generation within 
popular culture, rather than pretending to engage with or interrogate the 
contested and problematic concept of the generation and its sub-grouping of 
cohorts,12 as a device through which to interrogate the practices and processes 
of legal interpretation which are presumed to be interpreted and construed time 
out of mind, unchanged across decades and centuries.  The concept of the 
‘generation’ (or more correctly, the cohorts) was modified in this study by one key 
respect: secondary schooling and legal education.13  
 
In popular culture, these differences have become the stuff of regular 
commentary, at one extreme taking the form of outright generational blame and 
                                                 
11
 Among a vast body of literature, which encompasses the political, economic and social concerns of 
research into generations, for example: Ron Eyerman and Bryan S Turner, ‘Outline of a Theory of 
Generations’ (1998) 1 European Journal of Social Theory 91; June Edmonds and Bryan S Turner, ‘Global 
Generations: Social Change in the Twentieth Century’ (2005) 56 British Journal of Sociology 559; Mark 
McCrindle and Emily Wolfinger, ‘Generations Defined’ (2010) 18 Ethos 8. 
12
 For example: Tara Brabazon, From Revolution to Revelation: Generation X, Popular Memory, and 
Cultural Studies (Ashgate, 2004); Ken Roberts, ‘The End of the Long Baby-Boomer Generation’ (2012) 15 
Journal of Youth Studies 479; Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Moral Pitfalls of Memory Studies: The Concept of Political 
Generations’ (2012) 5 Memory Studies 111. 
13
 Leiboff, above n 6, 148 at n 8. 
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intergenerational hostility. Yet law has barely considered whether generational 
differences affect it and its practices,14 so this work builds on the existing broad 
literature into the influence that, among other things, race, gender and ethnicity  
have had on the processes of legal interpretation. On the other hand, a literature 
exploring how ordinary and everyday knowledge flows into the cultural mind of 
lawyers has demonstrated how experiential blind spots affect and influence the 
processes of legal interpretation. Lawyers are clearly influenced by popular 
culture to the extent that the cultural form of law is conceived of as constitutive of 
law itself. Moreover, lawyers (from law students to the judiciary) draw on 
idealised television or film lawyers through which to frame their own concepts of 
legal behaviour.15 As a proto-measure of generational difference, for example, 
television lawyers are not generationally diffuse: while Rumpole of the Bailey is 
well known to older groups of lawyers,16 younger groups are not familiar with this 
fictional, televised barrister, while CSI or 24 is well known with younger groups of 
lawyers and though accessible to older generations of lawyers, those older 
lawyers are less ‘taken’ with these programs.17   
 
How could they not know that? 
 
Compelling or perhaps most relevant for communications and intellectual 
property law is,whether it is aware of it or not, these areas of law contain some of 
                                                 
14
 Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories: Contexts and Practices (Lawbook Co 2009); contra 
Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press,1993)108 – 110. 
15
 Cassandra Sharp, 'Scarlet Letter or Chastity Belt? What Legal Dramas of the Twenty-first Century are 
Telling Law Students about a Career in Law' (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 90; Cassandra Sharp, 'Changing the 
Channel: What to Do with the Critical Abilities of Law Students as Viewers?' (2004) 13 Griffith Law Review 
185; Les Moran, 'Cause Lawyering "English Style": Reading Rumpole of the Bailey’ in Austin Sarat and S 
Schiengold (eds), The Cultural Life of Cause Lawyers (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 29; Steve 
Greenfield et al, Film and the Law (Hart, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 
16
 Moran, above n 15. 
17
 Desmond Manderson, ‘Trust Us Justice:  24, Popular Culture and the Law‘,  
<http://law.anu.edu.au/news/2010_College_Seminars/Manderson_paper.pdf>2010; Cassandra Sharp  'The 
Extreme Makeover Effect of Law School: Students Being Transformed by Stories' (2005) 12 Texas 
Wesleyan Law Review 233. 
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the most recognisable cultural markers contained within case lawin any area of 
law, precisely because of the subject matter of consideration of these areas of 
law. Popular culture references (of any era) act as something like a radioactive 
isotope, or carbon dating technique that can be used to track generations and the 
knowledge and discourses they share. Pop culture is unique in that it is simply 
absorbed into the consciousness of the individual, ‘the soundtrack to our lives’, 
andis not easily transmitted across generations. In short, it is embodied.18 But as 
well as pop culture,19 the educational experiences of the associated generation – 
the canons of literature, the school play, the generationally transmitted songs and 
experiences received from parents and grandparents - are also absorbed and 
habituated within a generation.20 They are not transmitted beyond a generational 
grouping save in exceptional instances where extra-generational transmission 
occurs.21 Holders of primary, absorbed knowledges acquired through habituation 
also hold shared reference points that function as a discursive shorthand.   While 
aspects of this knowledge can be acquired later in life, such learning is always 
secondary and cannot replicate the primary experience of ‘being there’. In short, 
we embody and then deploy pictorial, visual, imaginary images of the world 
through which to read and experience the world around us.  Events can only be 
                                                 
18
 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations   (Richard Nice trans, Stanford University Press, 2000) [trans of: 
Méditations pascaliennes (first published 1997)]; Tony Bennett, ‘The Historical Universal: The Role of 
Cutlural Value in the Historical Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu’ (2005) 56 British Journal of Sociology 141; 
Wendy Bottero, ‘Intersubjectivity and Bourdieusian Approaches to Identity’ (2010) 4 Cultural Sociology 3. 
19
As Desmond Manderson reminds us, popular culture is of an older everyday provenance than perhaps the 
more recent law and film and law and television studies suggests : Desmond Manderson, ‘Fission and 
Fusion: From improvisation to Formalism in Law and Music’ (2010) Critical Studies in Improvisation 
<http://www.criticalimprov.com/index.php/csieci/article/view/1167/1717>. 
20
 Gerbert Kraaykamp and Koen van Eijck, ‘The Intergenerational Reproduction of Cultural Capital: A 
Threefold Perspective’ (2010) 89 Social Forces 209, 226; cf Tom F.M. ter Bogt et al, ‘Intergenerational 
Continuity of Taste: Parental and Adolescent Music Preferences’ (2011) 90 Social Forces 297.  
21
Jostein Gripsrud et al, ‘Changing relations: Class, Education and Cultural Capital’ (2011) 39 Poetics 507. 
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truly shared and only fully comprehensible to those with whom experiences are 
shared.22  
 
In law, we acquire another level of the disposition of habituation – the ability to 
read and interpret the law using rules, doctrines and devices which are shared by 
‘us’ and not by others.  Yet none of us can read the texts of law uniformly unless 
we shared the learning of law in a particular time and place – or a habituation into 
a particular milieu.  
 
Thus the findings of this project sit against the backdrop of a set of markers that 
suggest that generational difference does affect how certain types of legal 
interpretation occurs.  The general findings of the project as well asthe specific 
instancereported here reveal that differences in the kinds of knowledges held 
between generations and the heuristics deployed by them when knowledge was 
not held by an individual or where a different interpretation is constructed about 
the same cultural markersindicate that the texts of law are far from safe, sound 
and secure.  Rather they are contested, unstable, and thoroughly and 
surprisingly combative. In order to explore quite how the seemingly trivial 
allusions or reference points provoked such extraordinary responses, a brief 
overview of the project will be traced. 
 
Australian and UK courts will occasionally directly reference the cultural as a 
practice to illuminate their reasoning – from Gilbert and Sullivan to Dickens to the 
Homeric.23  More often than not, these reference points will be treated as otiose 
or a slip of the judicial pen.   Elms argues that cases are replete with references 
from classical allusion and other forms of non-legal references which are used 
                                                 
22
 Stijn Daenekindt and Henk Roose, ‘A Mise-en-scène of the Shattered Habitus: The Effect of Social 
Mobility on Aesthetic Dispositions Towards Films’ (2011) European Sociological Review 
<www.esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/05/13/esr.jcr038>  
23
 Peter Goodrich, ‘Legal Enigmas – Antonio de Nebrija, The Da Vinci Code and the Emendation of Law’ 
(2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7; Peter Goodrich, ‘Screening Law’ (2009) 21 Cardozo Studies in 
Law and Literature 1. 
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amplify or explain the reasoning or principles adopted in judgments, in order to 
make judgments clearer, or to elucidate an aspect of the reasoning.24  The 
results of the project here suggest these conclusions are illusory at best. For 
lawyers of a particular time and place, the classics were habituated, these 
conclusions may make perfect sense, but for lawyers of another generation, such 
allusions are meaningless. Scholarship such as Elms’ presumes the existence of 
shared cultural, social, historical and linguistic discourses amongst its members 
and that ‘proper’ allusion is confined to the classics, themselves a marker of 
Bourdieusian distinction.25  Within this account of a ‘proper’ culture for lawyers, 
pop culture does not exist, forming instead a ghostly and perhaps ghastly vector, 
failing to meet the expectation of the limits of lawyering.  The Homeric yes, 
Marilyn Manson, definitely not, James Bond – just. 
 
This study revealed something very different amongst its lawyer participants. 
Most were dismissive of the use of classical or canonical allusions of any kind, 
with interviewees of most age groups (but not all) suggesting that the courts were 
obfuscating at best, or showing off at worst. None holding a negative response 
accepted or agreed with the view that the allusions were designed to improve 
understanding of the principle or point being expounded in the legal text.  
Interviewees who understood allusions did not share these negative responses – 
indeed, they were oblivious to the possibility that the courts were ‘showing off’.  
‘Distinction’ is grounded in familiarity, natural for those habituated and 
acculturated, but not for those who were ‘newcomers’.26  
 
                                                 
24
 Elwyn Elms, ‘On the Use of Classical Allusions in Judgment Writing’ (2008) 31 UNSW Law Journal 56. 
25
 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (R Nice trans, Routledge, 1984) 
[trans of: La Distinction, Critique sociale du judgement (first published 1979)].; Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of 
Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field  (S Emanuel trans, Polity Press, 1996) [trans of: Les Règles 
de l’ art (first published 1992)]; cf Tony Bennett, ‘Culture Choice Necessity: A Political Critique of Bourdieu’s 
Aesthetic’  (2011) 39 Poetics 530. 
26
 Simon Gunn, ‘Translating Bourdieu: Cultural Capital and the English Middle Class in Historical 
Perspective’ (2005) 56 British Journal of Sociology 49, 60-61.  
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These responses suggest that an assumed knowledge forms the backdrop to 
shaping and structuring the sedimentary layer on which judgments are formed, 
as a kind of unconscious, careless (or carefree) heuristic. While Balkin has 
argued that this kind of heuristic forms a cultural software that renders and 
reshapes meanings at an ideological level,27 my aim here is far less elevated and 
much more low-brow,, .  When the courts refer to Mrs Malaprop in a contract 
case,28 or Janis Joplin, the Mikado, Audrey Hepburn, or the Book of Common 
Prayer, even James Bond, and from Dickens to even more Dickens, it marks the 
judge who uses the reference and marks the lawyer who understands the 
reference. However, the results of this study have confirmed that it is not 
vouchsafed that all generations of lawyers will share or understand why these 
references are made.29 
 
The project revealed, unexpectedly, that eventhe most recent cases will be read 
differently by different generations of lawyers, and that meanings intended by the 
court in their use of non-legal knowledge, such as references to Janis Joplin, 
James Bond, and Audrey Hepburn (in the case under consideration in this 
article), are and will be read according to the cultural markers and reference 
points of that generation to the exclusion of the intention of the court –as  Roland 
Barthes’‘death of the author’ reveals .30 When the courts, in connection with 
popular and high culture references, say, ‘That is a well-known extract’ or 
‘Everyone knows that’ or ‘No one has any difficulty in understanding’, this study 
showed that nothing could be further from the truth. Responses are 
generationally grounded but as this study also shows, this is not a singular 
process applicable to one or other generation rather it is something that happens 
                                                 
27
 J M Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology (Yale University Press, 1998). 
28
 Leiboff, above n 6, 155-156. 
29
 Leiboff and Thomas, above n 21. 
30
 Roland Barthes, ‘Death of the Author’ (1967) Aspen 5. 
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to all of us.31  Even when uniformities of knowledge do exist, discourses will still 
be subject to reinscriptions and re-creations.  As Costas Douzinas points out: ‘the 
past is always caught in the forgetfulness of memory and the impurities of the 
archive … Memory amends as it repeats and every repetition is always repetitive 
and original according to the law of iteration.’32  The past is indeed always a 
foreign country.33  
 
Talkin' ‘bout law's generations: the project 
 
As noted earlier, this project is not about intellectual property and 
communications law. nstead it was designed to explore the possibility of an 
intergenerational interpretative dissonance in the interpretation of case law.  The 
point of the project was to find out how non-legal discourse is deployed by legal 
actors as part of the process of interpreting law – and the consequences this has 
intra and intergenerationally.   
 
The study was designed in 2009, conducted during 2010, and continued to be 
analysed during 2011 and into 2012.  It involved 90 participants, all of whom 
were legally trained, including a range of practitioners, and law students who had 
completed at least one year of law studies.  All participants undertook a quiz-
style survey, comprising 40 questions, before a smaller cohort of 45 was selected 
to be interviewed. The survey results created a data set which was used to 
identify what knowledge was held by different generational groupings, and if any 
differences existed between those generational groupings.   The interviews, 
made up of 12 questions, drew on this data to seek interviewee responses about 
any differences between generational groupings; in addition, interviewees were 
asked to read an extract of a case and the reading of the case formed part of the 
                                                 
31
 This finding is consonant with the findings of Daenekindt and Roose, above n 22. 
32
 Costas Douzinas, ‘Theses on Law, History and Time’ (2006) Melbourne Journal of International Law 13. 
33
 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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interview discussion.  Interviewees were provided with a copy of an extract of the 
case a week before the interview.  One case from a pool of six was given to each 
interviewee, distributed across the generational divide. The cases were chosen 
because they each represent a particular generational ‘moment’; for 
example,because they used archaic language, made reference to specific 
events, or contained generationally specific knowledge or ambivalent or 
contested linguistic, theoretical, political and historical material vital to 
understanding the reasoning or principles developed in the relevant case.   
 
In the quiz phase of the project, information was sought about participant’s 
education, their interests, their background (optional only), their attitude towards 
legal thinking and employment experience.  The quiz proper was grounded in a 
series of general knowledge benchmarking questions and extracts from cases 
where the judgment contained very specific references to or historical 
knowledge.  One of these benchmark questions, which involves a song the 
subject of a copyright case (but not the case itself), will be discussed later in this 
article. The quiz questions were structured to find out what knowledge was 
shared between and across generations of lawyers, and to find out what beliefs 
are shared across generations and not about individuals; the views of individuals 
obtained during the interview phase are subject to discussion.  
 
As well as a series of general knowledge questions designed to benchmark 
generational knowledge and the deployment of interpretative markers by 
participants, created with particular case reference in mind, the quiz drew on a 
bank of cases which used generationally specific cultural references, either 
through contemporary judgements or in certain instances, older judgments. 
Except in three instances, none of the questions sought to find out what law was 
known by participants. It should be stressed that excerpts from cases were, in 
the main, designed to exclude any reference to or about the legal principle under 
consideration.  The intention was not to get the participants to interpret the law, 
though some chose to find a legal interpretative pathway through the bare 
 13 
cultural references disclosed. All the extracts, however, were chosen because 
the courts drew upon pop culture references or because understanding the 
reasoning used by the courtrequires particular historical or linguistic knowledge.34  
 
A number of intellectual property cases, mostly copyright, were included in the 
mix of cases that made up the quiz, and one was used in the interview.  The 
cases were drawn from Australian and UK decisions, along with generalist 
questions and instances from a range of other areas of law, including contract, 
property, crime and migration law. The examples came from cases decided over 
the last 300 years (all of which are still extant in the sense that they are all still 
cited) and across the millennia for general knowledge.  Except for Hansen v 
Bickfords,35 the cases used will not be discussed in this article, but it was 
expected that certain cases and questions about the cases would be problematic 
for all generations, some would be problematic for some generations only, and 
that different generations would read some of the questions differently because 
of different knowledge bases.   
 
In broad terms, the project discovered that the reading of popular culture, 
historical, literary, and language references contained within the reasoning 
component of judgments is generationally fragmented, and that the conventional 
patterns of legal analysis will be displaced by generationally-grounded 
interpretations of that text when knowledge is not held by an individual. The 
generational character is highlighted by the results of ‘outlier’ individuals within a 
generation whose knowledge matched that of the text’s creator, and hence that 
of a (usually) older generation.  In some of the case extracts, judges prefaced 
these non-legal references with phrases such as ‘everyone knows that’, or ‘that is 
a well known extract’, or ‘no one misunderstands’. The results instead revealed 
that many participants did not know what was meant at all. 
                                                 
34
 Leiboff, above n 6, 155-156, 162. 
 
35
 Above n 7. 
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Curiously, it was not expected that a 2008 case like Hansen v Bickfords would 
provide any cultural slippage at all, but as will be seen, the case provoked an 
extraordinarily rich and diverse set of readings across the generational divide. So 
while the project assumed there would be a loss of knowledge across 
generations and across time (which it did find), it was also found that that 
contemporary cultural reference points were interpreted differently between 
generations because of the differences in tacit knowledge deployed by them. 
More significantly, the findings showed that the reference points held by the 
courts were not necessarily shared by legal interpreters, who, for the most part, 
would interpret the reasoning of the court through their own generationally held 
interpretative framework. The closer the reader was generationally to the 
decision, the more likely it was that they would interpret the case uniformly or as 
intended by the court, while the more distant the generational grouping, the more 
likely it was that they would impose personally derived readings on the case. The 
project revealed that all generations do this to some extent or other, but the 
youngest age group was more likely to be sure that their imposed knowledge 
was correct. 
 
While the survey provided base data, it was during the interview phase of the 
project that these generational differences could be teased outin more detail.  No 
correlations were made with the quiz completed by the participant, but certain 
information was sought again, such as age group.  As well as dealing with any 
questions the interviewee might have had, the interview was devoted to exploring 
what interviewees thought about why the courts use the examples they did, and 
how they would have reacted if they had to deal with the examples in a practical 
situation.  They were given scope to respond to the  court’s use of the examples; 
but rather than being merely perplexed or surprised about the use of examples 
outside of their control, more than half the participants were scathing about the 
judicial use of references outside of their own knowledge base.  One of the 
youngest interviewees, when shown the results of the second of these two 
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examples retorted: ‘Why would he use an example when he knew that I wouldn’t 
know that?’As follow up, it was suggested in the interview that the judge had not 
seen the results of the pilot study so he wouldn’t have known that the participant 
might not have understood the reference.)   
 
As expected, this irritation coalesced in the younger age groups, but it 
surprisingly also surfaced in participants born in the first part of the 1950s, who 
had children in the youngest age groups in the study.  Their irritation appeared to 
be on behalf of the younger age groups. A Gen X - Y interviewee asked: ‘Why 
did you ask questions I didn’t know the answer to?’.  An older Baby Boomer 
insisted that any future quiz be changed so that everyone would be able to 
answer the questions, but expressed horror and disbelief that others, especially 
members of the younger age groups, did not know things he took for granted.  A 
Gen X participant remonstrated that the quiz ‘only used archaic cases’even 
though most of the cases were identified as having been decided in the 20th and 
early 21st century.  The judges had used words or references understood by their 
own or a contiguous older generation.  Overall, members of the same or a 
contiguous generational grouping would be more likely to understand the same 
references; conversely, new references were less likely to be shared by older 
generations and more likely to be shared by younger generations.  
 
On the other hand, some of the younger age groups were abashed about their 
lack of knowledge and what this might mean for their ability to find out how to 
interpret cases from the past.However, most chose to interpret that which they 
did not know or did not understand through the prism of their own experiences 
and their own knowledge base.  Of all of the participants, it was those whose own 
experience stretched across the generational divide through agetheir connection 
with an earlier form of legal trainingcombined with a continued link to the present 
with older grandchildren who were most able to nimbly shift across the 
generational divide and interpret the cultural reference points used in the study 
most adeptly. 
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As the project disclosed, when a more expanded extract from a case was 
provided to participants at interview phase, most participants chose not to read 
the complete text provided, instead skimming over ‘irrelevancies’ to find the 
principle or ratio in the case.  Because they were given a week to read the 
extract before the interview, a number of participants accessed the full case or 
found a case note about the case in order to locate the legal principle, so that 
they could ‘correctly’ discuss the case in the interview.  In the interview, 
participants were taken to the extract in depth and asked about particular 
passages in order to find out why they had skimmed over this aspect of the 
extract or to ask why the courts had used the references. As well as provoking 
the hostile result noted above – judicial showing off or judicial obfuscation – 
interviewees, particularly those who took the view that these factors were 
irrelevant or unimportant, expressed their own strong interpretative preferences 
that had much to do with their own experiences, knowledge and partiality. 
 
Quiz partiality? 
 
Of course, a quiz and study of this kind is always open to the possibility that the 
quiz will bear the trace of their designer and their interests, and it is 
acknowledged that choices made in the design of the quiz and the use of the 
extracts may be partial. The general questions and cases were chosen however 
to represent a range of areas of law, and the general questions, though 
seemingly unrelated to the cases, were constructed as a back story, as it were, 
to the case extracts, or because they drew upon accepted principles in law.  
Participants were instructed that it would be unlikely that they could answer more 
than one third of the questions, to leave questions they did not know and not 
attempt to answer them, and to not try to interpret questions they did not know – 
that they would either know or they would not know. Curiously, many participants 
ignored this direction, and rather than treat the quiz as a ‘pub-quiz’ as they were 
also directed, chose to treat the questions as an exam.  Participants personalised 
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the quiz as a marker of their abilities, and this goes some way towards explaining 
the hostility towards the use of cultural references by the courts.  It also helps 
explain how the law and its assumed technocratic rigours is subverted by the 
seemingly irrelevant of heuristics, as will be shown through the results of two 
aspects of the project – a benchmarking question and the responses to 
Finkelstein J’s remarks in Hansen v Bickfords. 
 
Daisy 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the benchmark questions concerned a song the 
subject of a copyright case (but not the case itself).  The case, a ‘copyright fossil’ 
concerning the possibility of a dramatic copyright in the performance and staging 
of a song, was the subject of an 1895 decision in Fuller v Blackpool Winter 
Gardens.36 It was held that no such copyright would be granted over the 
performance of the very popular song ‘Daisy Bell’ sung by Katie Lawrence, 
whose husband, George Fuller, brought the action.  The case is still cited for the 
principles it contains but the song itself, the subject of a literary work and musical 
work, was merely mentioned by its title within the text of the judgment. Daisy Bell 
is to most contemporary eyes meaningless, an old and unknown song.  But a 
curiosity about the name, and its closeness in title to a song I always knew as 
‘Daisy’, took me to look up the song, and found that it was the same song.  But 
as I discovered, the song I knew was only the chorus, and my assumptions, that 
the song was from the 1920s or 1930s, was clearly wrong.  The song, written by 
the Englishman Harry Dacre in 1892,37 became an extremely popular music hall 
song – a pop song of its generation  on both sides of the Atlantic and around the 
English speaking world. Americans assume it is an American song due to its 
popularity. My own mistake came from my own personal association with the 
song, sung to me by my father who was born in that era; I created a history for 
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 [1895] 2 Q.B. 429 
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daisy_Bell 
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the song based on my own experience. As will be seen shortly, I am not the only 
person of my generational grouping who made the same mistake for exactly the 
same reasons.  The song (or more particularly the chorus), like Happy Birthday, 
continues to be passed on across the generations, time out of mind.  However, it 
has other cultural resonances.  It became the first song sung on a computer, the 
IBM 7094, in 1961, inspiring the scene in Kubrick’s 1968 film 2001: A Space 
Odyssey in which HAL 9000 sings the song as it is deactivated.38  That a mistake 
about the song could ever have been made seems, in adulthood, absurd, as the 
song is clearly cadenced as a music hall song of the late 19th century.  
 
But as the benchmarking showed, its timelessness and the close personal 
associations through which it is transmitted was a commonplace amongst project 
participants.  They were asked to read the following words, which are the chorus 
of Daisy Bell: 
 
Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer, do,  
I'm half crazy all for the love of you.  
It won't be a stylish marriage -  
I can't afford a carriage,  
But you'd look sweet upon the seat  
Of a bicycle built for two.39  
 
Participants were asked if the words meant anything to them, as well as how they 
knew the words, and when they would identify the decade when the words were 
made public (having been given a series of identifying eras replicated in the table 
below).  The words were unadorned and made no reference to the existence of a 
song, and they did not identify a title.  Participants identified titles in certain 
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daisy_Bell 
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 I wish to acknowledge the participants at the Third Annual Conference on Innovation and Communications 
Law, Melbourne 2011, who sang along, music hall style, when asked.  That a proportion of the participants 
clearly knew the song, while others were mystified and excluded, replicated the findings of the study. 
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instances, generally plumping for Daisy or Daisy, Daisy.  For the purposes of this 
article, the decade identified by participants and the self-identification of who 
knew the words will be considered here in statistical form: 
 
Daisy Bell 
  Builders + Older 
Baby Boomers
40
 
Generation Jones Generation X Mid Point Generation Y 
1925 – 1953  1954 – 1965  1966 – 1975  1976 – 1985  1986 -  
Who knew? 86%  77%  45%  30% 34%  
1890  17%  25%        
1900            
1910      33%      
1920  33%  25%  33%      
1930  33% 12.5%        
1940  17%  25%        
1950          50%  
1960    12.5% 33% 100%    
1970          50% 
 
As the table shows, the oldest generational groupings were most likely to identify 
that they could recognise the words, and the slippage across the generational 
divide is clearly visible.  Yet those who identified the words did not all identify a 
decade, especially in the youngest age group.  Identification is strongest in the 
two oldest generational groupings (the combined group and Generation Jones) is 
telling, as is the ability of a good proportion of these groups to correctly identify 
the song’s decade.  Even more telling is that the majority of these age groups 
shared my own generational (Generation Jones) reading of the song’s era.  
There is a conundrum about the identification of the song in the two youngest 
generational groupings;  while some did know Daisy Bell, most thought this was 
some other song that had the word ‘daisy’ in the lyrics.  The shifting of the 
                                                 
40
 These two age groups have been reported as a combined group because of the small numbers of the 
sample in the Builders group (1925 – 1945). 
 20 
decade to the 1960s and beyond is emblematic of the tendency to associate with 
a constructed time frame from the past as well as having misidentified the song. 
Curiously, Generation X is clearly acting as a pivot generation; while fewer than 
half could identify the words, those who did split across the generational divide, 
clearly showing how interpretative ‘brightlines’ are formed and then lost.  In 
interview (and self-identified in the quiz) those who knew the song correctly 
identified that their parents had sung the song to them, and this, like me, 
contributed to our incorrectly identifying the song’s decade. For the record, none 
of the sample could identify the song’s association with the copyright action. 
 
This benchmarking question showed quite clearly how different generational 
groupings create meanings about texts with which partial or incomplete 
knowledge is held.  It is necessary to extrapolate, but longitudinally, it seems 
likely that the older the generational grouping and thus closeness to the song’s 
own point of creation would have seen the results skew closer to the correct 
decade.  But as the responses to Finkelstein J’s remarks in Hansen v Bickfords41 
show, interpretative closure cannot be vouchsafed even within when dealing with 
contemporary cultural reference points amongst and between generational 
groupings. 
 
Of Aston Martin, Mercedes-Benz, and Tiffany’s 
 
In 2006, Bickfords, an Australian drink company, adopted the get up, moniker 
and ingredients of Monster Energy, an energy drink sold by the US company, 
Hansen. Hansen distributed Monster Energy throughout a number of markets 
around the world. Directed towards a young male demographic (18 – 30 age 
bracket), the Hansen product had not been sold in Australia when Bickfords 
began marketing the drink. Hansen, unsurprisingly, sought an injunction and 
damages against Bickfords relying on passing off and s 52 of the then Trade 
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 Hansen Beverage Company v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] 251 ALR 1. 
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Practices Act 1974 (Cth).42  What was at issue was whether Hansen had a 
sufficient reputation in Australia in its energy drink mark to found an action in 
either area of law. 
 
The law of passing off protects those with a reputation from others pretending or 
‘passing off’ their own products in such a way as to suggest that they have an 
association with the well known product.  Section 52, as it was, is used as an 
alternate statutory protection of reputation, expressed in terms of corporations 
not engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce.  
 
The product similarities went without saying. Though Hansen had not registered 
its ‘mark’ in 2004 when Bickfords began to investigate producing an energy drink, 
Hansen had used indirect marketing, including sponsorships and the use of the 
mark on products of interest to the target market in Australia before it began 
marketing its products in Australia.  Hansen wanted to popularise Monster 
Energy in Australia, and become known in Australia prior to the launch of the 
energy drink.  
 
Because it had not yet began selling the product, a line of case law potentially sat 
against Hansen, and at first instance, Middleton J held that the incidental or 
indirect marketing used by Hansen’s was insufficient to constitute a reputation of 
a standard needed to protect its product, because an insufficient number of 
people in the target market knew about Hansen’s product. On appeal, the Full 
Federal Court (Tamberlin, Finkelstein and Siopis JJ) held that Middleton J’s 
approach to establishing reputation in Australia was incorrect, by focussing on a 
defined and confined group for the purposes of interpreting s 52.   
 
Tamberlin J (Siopsis J agreeing) determined that the appropriate test should be 
'whether or not insignificant number of persons in the Australian community, in 
                                                 
42 Now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
 22 
fact or by inference, have been misled or are likely to be misled, even in those 
persons are mostly or exclusively extreme sports enthusiasts’.43 It was with 
respect to the analysis and construction of indirect advertising and its value to a 
market that Finkelstein J directed his judgment: 
 
When the case is reheard44 I think the judge is also required to give 
greater weight than he was prepared to give to the indirect 
marketing campaign undertaken by Hansen to establish its 
reputation. It is quite clear that the judge was wary of indirect 
advertising45 … [but the] judge’s caution is, I think, misplaced.46 The 
most obvious form of advertising, and the easiest form of 
advertising to understand, is the direct message. But the 
advertising industry has now moved away from primarily relying on 
direct advertising. The belief is, and the belief is likely to be correct, 
that indirect communication sometimes expresses a point with 
more impact … an advertisement will have effect although the 
consumer is not aware someone is trying to communicate a 
message.47 There are numerous studies that show that this type of 
indirect advertisement is far more effective at eliciting a consumer 
recall response than a direct television commercial.48 
 
James Bond, Janis Joplin, Audrey Hepburn  
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 Hansen Beverage Company v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] 251 ALR 1, 48. 
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 The case was settled after the Full Federal Court decision and was not heard again at first instance. 
45
 Hansen Beverage Company v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] 251 ALR 1, 60. 
46
 Ibid, 61. 
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 Ibid, 62. 
48
 Ibid, 63. 
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Finkelstein J’s concluding tag linein this passage that is relevant here, due toits 
pop cultural reference pointsand the range of interpretations made of those 
reference points in this study: 
 
In my opinion the judge was entitled to infer that the indirect brand 
advertising employed by Hansen (and, for that matter, Bickfords) 
can establish reputation as well as, if not better than, direct 
advertising. After all, everyone knows that James Bond drives an 
Aston Martin, Janis Joplin wanted to own a Mercedes Benz and 
Audrey Hepburn had breakfast at Tiffany’s.’49 (emphasis added) 
 
Everyone knows?  
 
Perhaps everyone does not know.  This last extract was included in the quiz 
phase of the project, which wasat that poiint supplemented by a series of 
questions (contained in the table below), with respect to the pop culture 
references used by Finkelstein J. While nearly everyone could identify something 
about these references, how they were interpreted and how they were deployed 
was far from uniform, and was fundamentally contested.  More particularly, 
Finkelstein J’s interpretative gesturein relation to that interpretation coloured the 
perception of the point that Finkelstein J made and it is this that identifies a 
generationally grounded aporetic misreading of these reference points.   
 
The phrase ‘everyone knows’, though capable of being read as a rhetorical tic, 
expects and demands a response or reaction, that the reader either knows or is 
excluded from the references used to underscore reasoning about the ability of 
indirect images to reach into the consciousness of the public.  In other words, 
whether Finkelstein J prefaced his examples with a phrase like ‘everyone knows’, 
the point is that he would expect everyone to know and to share the cultural 
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 Ibid, 64. 
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reference points he made. But it must also be pointed out that, as Douzinas 
reminded us at the outset, that the archive of memory is also open to 
reinterpretation.50  For Finkelstein J’s use of these reference points is perhaps 
clouded in a purple haze that says as much about the judge as individual as it 
says about the different generational interpretations and inflections that come 
from the use of pop culture reference points.   
 
Finkelstein Js use of these references needs to be clarified in this respect: they 
are the ‘new’ classical allusions designed to illuminate and clarify a point about 
the value and capture of ‘indirect’ marketing.  In other words, one did not have to 
‘directly market’ Tiffany’s, Mercedes Benz or Aston Martins if associated with 
Audrey Hepburn, James Bond, or Janis Joplin (or so he thought). The 
association with the popular culture icon will do the job sufficiently, and is as 
effective, if not more effective, than any paid advertising.  His images are borne 
of a particular moment of pop culture, and as the study revealed, not shared by 
other lawyers.  It is particularly significantthat his assumption and presumption of 
unpaid associations between the icon and the object, as it were, were not shared 
by other lawyers.  The result is that the law was interpreted very differently 
because these examples were read with very different cultural reference points in 
play. 
 
Thus while James Bond, a fictitious character created by the British author Ian 
Fleming in a series of books written during the 1950s and 1960s, drove an Aston 
Martin in the early and more recent film adaptations of the spy stories, the James 
Bond of the books drove a Bentley as well as an Aston Martin, and in some of 
the later films beginning in the 1980s that he started to drive a BMW. And for 
those of us oblivious to James Bond’s motoring habits, the reference to James 
Bond is meaningful, but his choice of vehicle another thing entirely.  And while 
the actor Audrey Hepburn appeared in the 1961 film Breakfast at Tiffany’s, 
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adapted from Truman Capote’s 1958 novella of the same name, it was not she 
who had ‘breakfast’, but the character, Holly Golightly who would visit Tiffany & 
Co and have breakfast outside the famous store.  Tiffany’s is, of course, a Fifth 
Avenue jewellery store in New York City (and now elsewhere around the world) 
but not a breakfast establishment.  And while Janis Joplin did indeed sing about 
wanting a Mercedes Benz (and a colour tv) as her friends all had Porsches (as 
indeed did she) in her last recording before she died from a drug overdose in 
1970, the singer and the song is largely unknown by younger generations who at 
best associate the song with ads for the car maker.  
 
The use and deployment of the references by Finkelstein J is already contested 
and not capable of sustaining a stable interpretative gesture even before 
exploration of what the participants in the project ‘did’ with these examples.  
Indeed, older participants were quick to ‘correct’ references to the Aston Martin if 
they knew the Ian Fleming books (hence the unusual pattern of results in 
Question 2 in the bank of questions below) while younger participants were 
irritated that the judge discounted their own image of a James Bond car, which 
was more likely to be a BMW. This age group were less likely to associate the 
character with an Aston Martin.  In the table below, the ‘correct’ responses of the 
different generational groupings are set out below, some of which are surprising, 
especially the mid-point grouping which did not follow the pattern of its 
contiguous generational groupings.  
 
Bond, James Bond 
 
It became apparent in the quiz (in part, at least) ,and more strongly in the 
interviews that of all three examples, James Bond was the most vividly held by 
participants of all the pop cultural artefacts and icons used by Finkelstein J.51  
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However this was due to a methodological error on my part in constructing the 
quiz, as I had not factored in the possibility that each generation would identify 
with their ‘own’ James Bond. Thus for the younger participants James Bond was 
not Sean Connery or Roger Moore and he did not drive an Aston Martin, 
ratherJames Bond was Daniel Craig or Pierce Brosnan.  In short, the reference 
to the Aston Martin was treated as an error by the judge, who had incorrectly 
referred to a very different car from the ‘right’ James Bond car.  For younger 
participants the ‘correct’ James Bond car was the BMW, or for others, the 
readoption of the Aston Martin in the most recent of the James Bond movies 
formed the touchstone rather than the adoption of the cars in the earlier films of 
the 1960s.  
 
A set of self identifying references to the first question on the list marks out the 
generational differences most clearly. Quiz respondents self-identified a 
reference to Ian Fleming (the creator of James Bond) to explain who James 
Bond (inserted into Question 1 below in brackets*) along generational lines, in 
contradistinction to the more widely held film version of the character. 
 
  
 Hansen v Bickfords 
Builders + Older 
Baby Boomers
52
 
Generation 
Jones 
Generation X Mid Point Generation Y 
1925-1953  1954-1965  1966-1975  1976-1985  1986-  
1  Who is James Bond? 100% (57%)* 100% (46%)* 100% (9.1%)* 90% (10%)* 70.9% (7.7%)* 
2  How do we know he drives 
an Aston Martin? 
86.7%  76.9%  90.9%  90%  74.4%  
3  Who is Janis Joplin? 86%  92%  81%  90%  51.5%  
4  How do we know she 
wanted to own a Mercedes 
Benz? 
71.4%  72%  54%  80%  25.6%  
5  Who is Audrey Hepburn? 100%  92.3%  100%  90%  79.5%  
6  How do we know she had 
breakfast at Tiffany’s? 
86.7%  84.6%  100%  90%  66.7%  
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So in the interview phase of the project, some of these reference points were 
explored more fully.  Most of the younger participants were not aware of Truman 
Capote’s novella or that the Aston Martin was not always one of James Bond’s 
cars. However there was one particular interview that provided an extraordinary 
insight into the effect that these different references points would have on the 
interpretation of the law itself. For while some interviewees took the view that 
these reference were mere throw away lines that were not even obiter, or 
perhaps an illustration of the reasoning used by the judge, others considered that 
this was simply a judge ‘showing off’, while others had no idea why a judge would 
make an observation like this. 
 
This interview was with a participant in the Generation Y age group.One 
questionasked in the quiz and followed through in the interviews was a point of 
inconsistency found in Finkelstein J’s three examples.  While the inconsistency I 
had had in mind was the reference to the actor Audrey Hepburn rather than the 
character Holly Golightly, this Gen Y participant plumped for Janis Joplin 
because ‘she did not get paid’.  I have to admit to being surprised and more than 
a little perplexed about this reply, because I really did not know what ‘payment’ 
could possibly have been made to the others, knowing as I did that neither 
Truman Capote nor Ian Fleming would have taken payment to mention either the 
Aston Martin or Tiffany’s in their books. I was also perplexed because this did not 
strike me to be Finkelstein J’s purpose or intention either, that these signifiers 
were not open but closed, even though they were located within a judgment 
about indirect marketing.   
 
Of course this interpolation on my part was not that of theparticipant.  Infact, the 
interviewee had assumed that the ‘others’ had been paid to product place. Given 
that in their more recent iterations, the James Bond franchises were the epitome 
of product placement, the participant would not have known otherwise in relation 
to the books and earlier films.  Thus Finkelstein J was taken to refer to paid 
product placement. On this the participant may not have been wrong but if 
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Finkelstein J did not consider any of these instances as examples of paid 
product; they were highly effective forms of marketing despite their non-
commercial purposes. This only highlighted the value of indirect marketing of a 
kind considered in the case. 
 
 For someone who had only known a world where overt paid product placement 
existed,53 it would be impossible to read and interpret the texts of this judgment 
without presuming the existence of some kind of commercial relationship 
between the creators of these iconic cultural references; such is the effect of 
brand saturation in the late 20th and early 21st century. To return to a world where 
products would or could be used in a film or book without payment is 
inconceivable and so those of us who remember when overt product placement 
was introduced in the 1980s (in contradistinction to other less overt modes of 
placement from magazine content to the more overly ‘sponsored’ program) will 
end up reading these cultural references very differently.  
 
Tempis Fugit (2) 
 
Finkelstein J’s comments in Hansen v Bickfords are one of those unusual 
instances where a case will make overt and explicit references to cultural 
markers in order to frame and order the heuristics used in the reasoning. Such is 
the significance of these seemingly random, throw away remarks.  They replicate 
the adoption of a thought process, the litmus that tells us just why the reasoning 
about indirect marketing was so strongly held in this judgment.  These references 
were clearly behind the fairly strident response he made in his judgment to the 
misreading of the potency of indirect brand advertising.   That the remarks in this 
2008 decision are not capable of being interpreted uniformly demonstrate just 
how porous and friable the texts of law are, and how captive they are to the 
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reading brought to bear by the legal interpreter who superimposes and 
interposes a reading of the text designed to clarify. Thus generational tics and 
inflections will subvert or embellish the most innocent of textual intentionalities in 
ways not factored into the practices of reading and interpreting the law. 
 
